Chefoo

During most of 1948-49, I had command of USS Higbee (DD-805) and strangely enough, we had two tours of duty during this period, with the Seventh Fleet, in the Orient. At this time, Higbee was the only combatant ship named after a woman. Lena Higbee was a registered nurse serving with the Navy during World War I. The ship was nicknamed either "Leaping Lena" or "Higburger."

The late-VAdmin. Oscar Badger was Com-Seventh Fleet during 1948. Admiral Badger was considered by the Navy as an officer’s and sailor’s admiral. He was a little short in height, well proportioned and his face was very weather beaten as if he had spent years on the open bridge of a destroyer through countless storms. The dominant features of his face were very bright piercing eyes, protected by enormous bushy eyebrows, that seemed to dance all over his brow when he scowled.

During this period, the Seventh Fleet normally consisted of two cruisers, a squadron of destroyers, a large seaplane tender with her covey of PBY’s , two submarines and the necessary support ships. I believe that ex-President Carter was at this time serving on one of these subs. We would get repairs and provisions either at Japan or at Subic Bay. At frequent intervals, we would visit different ports in China, Japan, the Philippines and some ports in the Indian Ocean. But we normally based at Tsingtao, China.

In 1948, the Chinese Communist forces under Mao had gained control of almost all of mainland China and the Chinese Nationalist forces had been surrounded at all major seaports or holed up at Chungking, Shanghai, Canton, Tsingtao, Chefoo, etc.; they were completely sealed off from the rest of China by Communist forces. The sea was the only opening for communications to the Nationalists.

Early one morning, I received a message from the flagship to report to the admiral immediately. This I did and when I was ushered into the admiral’s cabin, I was introduced to our ex-consular, a Mr. Smith (normally assigned to consular duty at Chefoo), and to the admiral’s intelligence officer. The admiral told me that he had been informed by the Chinese Nationalist Government that the Chinese Nationalist garrison at Chefoo would capitulate to the Communist forces at noon the next day, and that we would be allowed to evacuate any foreign nationals from Chefoo before noon of that day for safety, if we so desired.

My orders were to get Higbee underway, proceed to Chefoo, arrive at daybreak the next day; evacuate any foreign nationals who desired to be evacuated, so as not to fall into Communist hands. I was to leave Chefoo prior to noon with any non-Chinese foreign nationals who sought a safe haven. It was estimated that not more than 100 such evacuees would accompany us, plus the admiral’s intelligence officer. I was to keep the admiral fully informed of our whereabouts and of the progress of this evacuation. This operation was to be kept top secret and only privileged ComSeventh Fleet staff and necessary personnel on Higbee.

The admiral asked if I had any questions or requests. I asked if I could send a message to Higbee to make all preparations to get under way, and to notify the shore patrol at Tsingtao to recall all Higbee personnel who might be ashore to return to the ship immediately. The admiral stated that he had already done these things.

On returning to the ship, we got underway at noon and we were immediately challenged by all our ships, except the flagship, about what we were doing. Each challenge was referred to ComSeventh Fleet. My squadron commander got very irate at me for my reply.

About six months before the Chinese Nationalists had purchased an old cruiser from Britain and we had seen it often at Tsingtao. But a month before it had completely disappeared from any ports that we normally visited. Our forces had been instructed to keep our admiral fully informed about the whereabouts of this missing cruiser anytime we might sight it. Some believed the cruiser might have shifted, to the Communist forces.

We proceeded up the coast of China and arrived at Chefoo at daybreak the next day. Never having been to Chefoo before, we had to exercise all precautions as the coastline was now under the control of the Communists and they had extinguished all navigational aides and there were numerous islands and shoals en route. On approaching Chefoo at daybreak, the weather was calm, but there was a fog and it was misty. Artillery shells and firing could be heard and faintly seen in the distance.

We picked up a large contact by radar and it was almost directly en route towards the harbor entrance. We passed about 2,000 yards from this object that definitely appeared to be the missing Chinese cruiser. I challenged it numerous times and identified myself but no reply ever came back from this cruiser nor was any flag showing and no identification markings were visible. It did have all its guns trained on us, and it out-gunned us by a fair margin.

By radio, I had reported to ComSeventh Flt that I was about five miles from Chefoo harbor and proceeding. We had sighted the missing cruiser, anchored. It refused to identify itself, when challenged, and no identifications were visible. Higbee was at General Quarters with its guns trained on this unknown cruiser. I intended to proceed to carry out the evacuation as ordered unless directed otherwise.

An uncommon phenomenon occurred just then. Due to the earth’s position relative to an enormous sunspot array on the surface of the sun closest to our area of the earth, all electronic and radio communications were wiped out by the electronic storm that was bombarding our particular area. I had no way of knowing whether or not ComSeventh Flt ever received my message. I was finally able to contact our cruiser, St. Paul, cruising off the coast of Guam. I asked her to relay my message to ComSeventh Flt.

Chefoo is a famous resort, where many of the wealthy Chinese, foreign diplomats and wealthy foreigners stay for the summer to escape the heat and the humidity of interior. Chefoo is somewhat similar to our Santa Barbara, California, being on the coast and surrounded by mountains/hills about 2,000-3,000 feet high that slope to the coastline. The sheltered harbor of Chefoo was extremely small, formed by a semi-circular stone quay with an entrance/exit not more than 100 yards wide. The widest part of the harbor itself was at the most 1200-1500 yards. This gave me little or no maneuvering room, particularly with an unknown cruiser with all its guns trained on us.

I dropped my hook at short stay to minimize any drifting and sent my whaleboats to the main landing with ex-consular Smith, the staff intelligence officer, two Chinese interpreters, a small landing force with rifles and bayonets, plus a communication team that would set a communication station on top the tallest building next to the landing docks. Their instructions were to gather all willing non-Chinese foreign national evacuees so that they could be ferried out to the ship not later than 1030; the ship would sail at 1100. No evacuee could bring more than two gladstone’s (bags) worth (size) of personal gear aboard the ship due to limited storage space. Much to my surprise ex-consular Smith went ashore carrying two gladstones.

Most streets leading to the harbor area went uphill and they were solid with human heads, many balancing boxes, baskets or bikes. They were people trying to escape Chefoo via the ocean. The pressure on the people at the edges of the docks was so great many were pushed into the water and drowned, if they couldn’t swim. There were several good sized sampans with only their masts above the water because too many evacuees had jumped into and swamped them. The surface of the harbor was littered with countless floaters (cadavers) - those who had fallen or had been pushed into the water and could not swim.

During this time the city was receiving intermittent bombardment from the hilltops by the Communist forces, causing some smoke, dust and a few fires.

Our landing force and group went ashore, and were able to advance through the densely packed mob surrounding the docking area. Up the streets they formed a sort of phalanx with fixed bayonets. It seemed that the Chinese had little respect for the rifles, but really respected bayonets pointed at them. They moved out of the way or else fell flat on the ground in order not to be stabbed by the bayonets I was later told by our men that countless Chinese repeatedly tried to bribe our whaleboat crews with priceless carved artifacts made of jade, ivory, rose quartz, etc., undoubtedly prize collections of many families, in order to be taken out to the ship. Of course, such could not be done as they were Chinese.

By 1045 we had received five stretcher cases (four nuns and a priest), and 77 ambulatory evacuees. All but one were from some religious order; none were Chinese. The lonely one was an Armenian merchant whose sole possession with him was a full case of Scotch that - at that time - would have cost at least $45 a bottle. The women and stretcher cases were placed in the Chief Petty Officers' area and the Chief Petty Officers and the men evacuated from Chefoo were sandwiched into other living areas. All baggage was left topside, covered with tarps and lashed down.

We raised anchor, maneuvered about and left the harbor about 1115 with the unknown cruiser still having all of its guns trained on us while our batteries were trained on them. I tried by radio to contact ComSeventhFlt to inform him of our progress, but could not succeed.

Shortly, after we had passed the Chinese cruiser, we had three of our light reco-bombers pass over us, one zoomed us for a closer look. We tried desperately to contact the planes by radio but without any luck. We then used light. I don’t think that our Air Force pilots can read signal light. During World War II and later during the Korean War, I never had any success whenever trying to communicate by light with an Air Force plane, much less by radio. Anyway the planes stayed less than ten minutes, when they started to head back to Japan. Apparently, they assumed we were okay.

I planned to arrive back at Tsingtao at daybreak the next day, if feasible. At about 2300, I finally contacted ComSeventhFlt by radio. We reported that we had 82 evacuees aboard, five of which were stretcher cases, four female and one male. All evacuees except one were of religious orders. I requested two or three ambulances on arrival to take care of the stretcher cases, plus enough trucks to haul 77 evacuees and their equivalent baggage. Two Jeeps also were requested to act as a van and rear guards for the composite convoy All vehicles were to display the U.S. flag. I assumed the ex-consular Smith and/or ComSeventhFlt staff would affect the deliverance of these evacuees to their Tsingtao destinations.

Chefoo view of the Higbee (click on the thumbnail to enlarge the picture)

Shortly after we had left Chefoo harbor, our ex-consular came on the bridge to report the results ashore of the evacuation. He asked when I could get free from the bridge, that he would like me to see what he had down in our wardroom.. I thanked him for his fine work and stated that when I had this Chinese cruiser out of my hair and when things would finally simmer down, that I would go down to the wardroom as requested.

In the early afternoon, so we could serve lunch to the officers, I went down to the wardroom with Smith and there spread out on the table was a most unusual display of Chinese artifacts. Most were beautifully painted with gold leaf or porcelainized; some, however, were in very bad shape. Smith explained that these artifacts came from what was believed to be the most extensive collection of very ancient Chinese bronzes collected by a German archeologist, Dr. Schmidt, who had spent over 45 years in China. Dr. Schmidt, who knew Smith very well, had evacuated from Chefoo about two months earlier, stopping by Tsingtaio en route to Shanghai, in order to visit him. He told Smith that, if he should return to Chefoo, he had full permission to take any remaining ancient bronzes found at Dr. Schmidt’s mansion as any bronzes not taken would undoubtedly fall into the hands of the Communists when Chefoo capitulated. That, then, was why ex-consular Smith had taken two bags with him when he went ashore at the start of the evacuation.

Mr. Smith stated that without help these priceless ancient bronzes would have fallen into the hands of the Communists. Therefore, he wanted me to have at least two of the pieces. I protested vigorously, stating that I was only carrying out the orders of Admiral Badger. However, Mr. Smith insisted I take some items and the staff intelligence officer stated he was sure the Admiral would approve. After much argument, I finally broke down and selected the smallest item, an old convex bronze mirror, initially having one surface glazed by mercury. It was supposedly used by royalty. The reflecting surface was badly worn. The second item I chose was a dilapidated broken idol, often repaired and badly burnt by candles and incense. It turned out to be a household goddess of fertility. (Much later these items were appraised and dated by specialists at the Los Angeles County Museum of Fine Arts as very authentic pieces. We, most likely, will bequeath these items to this museum later on. By tales, we had heard that priceless treasures were hidden inside some idols. No luck, this one just had countless cobwebs and spiders.)

The Chinese Nationalist forces defending all the besieged cities - Shanghai, Tsingtao, Chefoo, etc. - had no means of support except by controlling the customs charges for any landed food, materiel or equipment. Their minimum custom fee was 50 percent of the value of anything landed. That meant these evacuees would lose at least half of all their worldly possessions or one suitcase worth. This I could not stomach as I had to restrict what they could bring as personal effects, not knowing how many evacuees there would be coming onto the ship. I called together my executive officer, operations officer, Mr. Smith and the staff intelligence officer to discuss any possible way to prevent these evacuees from losing half of their worldly possessions to customs charges. We decided that the executive officer and Mr. Smith would be in the van jeep, the intelligence officer and my operation officer in the rear jeep, the ambulances and trucks between the jeeps, and with all vehicles flying a U.S. flag. If the Chinese Nationalists insisted on custom inspection, the van jeep would crash the wooden horse barricade and the convoy would follow, leaving the pier at good speed. The consular and intelligence officer would direct the ambulances, trucks, and evacuees to the closest and largest of the U.S.-affiliated churches where the evacuees would be left.

We arrived shortly after daybreak at Tsingtao and docked at the customs pier, where the ambulances, trucks and jeeps were waiting for the evacuees. All were quickly disembarked, all gear and luggage placed in the trucks, and the ship then got underway to its assigned anchorage. On questioning of my executive officer and operations officer later in the morning, I learned that the Chinese were insisting on a customs inspection, so the leading jeep had to crash through the wooden horse barricade, the convoy followed and the evacuees were deposited at nearby U.S. affiliated churches as planned. The main incident had caught the Chinese by complete surprise. And the only serious result was that several sentries had fired their rifles up into the air as warning shots, but no part of the convoy was shot at, apparently because all vehicles carried a U.S. flag.

At about 1300, I received an urgent message from the flagship to report immediately to the admiral. Upon reporting, I was escorted by two Marines to the admiral's quarters, where I was introduced to a Chinese general, a Chinese admiral and the mayor of Tsingtao. There were numerous Chinese staff personnel plus Chinese interpreters present. Many of them would point to me glaring and gesturing as if they would like to have me drawn and quartered and then boiled in oil. Our admiral eloquently apologized to the Chinese officials for the unfortunate incident of crashing through the barricade at the dock. He said he was very sorry that he had sent such a young and inexperienced officer to be in charge of this simple operation and that he had reported this incident to our ambassador in China with his full apologies. This incident had also been reported to our Navy Department and to our State Department in Washington. The admiral added that he would promptly take a stern and adequate disciplinary action as redress for this serious disregard from their custom laws, etc.

After much discussion, the Chinese officials and their staff left still glaring and pointing at me. After they had all left, including the Marines, the admiral turned to me with his icy stare, filtered by his bushy eyebrows, and he asked me for my side of the story so that he might have some additional information to report to our State and Navy Departments and our ambassador to China. I explained that I knew about the Chinese Nationalists' procedure concerning their customs requirements and that I had previously restricted the evacuees to only two suitcases of personal effects. I told the admiral that they had only two hours to collect their worldly possessions and then report to the dock at Chefoo. I added I just could not stomach the idea that these poor people losing at least half of their worldly possessions.

I told the admiral that I had ordered my executive officer and operation officer to do just what they did and that I took full and complete responsibility for this incident. The admiral said that I apparently did not understand the seriousness of this international incident by which we openly flouted the sovereignty of one of our closest allies. The admiral said that since he had ordered the evacuation, he was responsible for this incident and he had no idea what action the Navy and State departments might direct him to take.

His face then softened considerably, though, and in a very low voice, he stated that he was glad that I had done it. That, he said, was just between him, me and the hawse pipe.

Returning to his very stern voice, he directed me to get the HELL OUT of his cabin and to report to my ship. He added that if he saw me again, he might have to order me to stand trial by a general court martial for this serious offense.

I returned to my ship feeling most downtrodden and quite worried about my future in the U.S. Navy.

As always, however, the admiral's colors were flying true Blue and Gold. I have no idea what he had to go through with our State and Navy Department during his explanation of my fiasco. But knowing him as I did, he probably took full responsibility for what happened.

In a way, I also was a survivor of Chefoo — at least I survived the aftermath of the incident.

I am currently doing research on the history of Yantai, formerly known as Chefoo, in North China. I have just finished reading Captain James R. Hansen USN (Ret.) riveting account of the evacuation of foreign nationals from Chefoo in 1948. His account is entitled LAST EVACUATION OF FOREIGN DEVILS FROM CHEFOO.

Is it conceivable that someone took photographs of the evacuation? And if so, where might they be?

From reading the USS HIGBEE ASSOCIATION website, I see that there will be a reunion for association members in San Antonio, Texas, this September 15-19. Is it possible to mention this research sometime at this gathering? Since it is really very difficult to gather any information from Chinese sources about the evacuation here in Yantai, I really would appreciate any reminiscences from anyone who was part of the evacuation in 1948.

Yours sincerely,
Ted Margrett, yanshida@yahoo.com
China Canada College,
Shandong Institute of
Business and Technology,
Foreign Affairs Office,
Yantai, Shandong,
People's Republic of China

USS HIGBEE

DD / DDR 806

1945 - 1979

LAST EVACUATION OF FOREIGN

DEVILS FROM CHEFOO